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Part I of this Article will examine plain-text selections of legal language concerning mental
competency from the constitutions, codes, or relevant decisions by the highest national courts,
of three countries: the United States, Germany, and Japan. As three of the biggest economic
powers on the planet, these countries merit consideration not just for their contrasting cultural
and legal frameworks but also for their relative influence within the international arena during the
latter half of the twentieth century. Part I’s examination will focus on constitutional and code
language for two important reasons: (1) these sources of law form the basis of the country’s
legal system, and serve as the foundation for other, more specific forms of legislation; (2), as
the highest form of the country’s primary law, they serve as the legal standard against which
all the other laws are evaluated. Next, Part II will examining the relevant language and argue
that a certain set of cognitive functions, social-cognitive functions, most likely underlie these
strictly legal definitions. Finally, Part III will briefly examine how effectively these definitions
convey the prevailing scientific standard and consider what changes, if any, could be made to the
current definitions of mental competency in the United States to better reflect both these prevailing
scientific standards and the foreign definitions.
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Twenty-first century society has achieved an understanding of 
the human mind that would have been unthinkable even a decade ago. 
Revolutionary advances in scientific methods,1 computational 
technology,2 and medical practices3 have all fueled the production of 
an overwhelming amount of data about the structure and function of 
the human brain.4 Perhaps of greater significance to the legal context, 
scientific research has helped us understand the mental processes that 
underlie social interactions and that allow us to meaningfully engage 
with others’ feelings, emotions, and thoughts.5 Scientific inquiry has 
even begun to explain the biological and psychological bases for 
conscious thought and experience,6 bringing us one step closer to 
understanding what it truly means to be human. These breakthroughs, 
which have created many exciting new opportunities for research and 
scholarship and have inspired a considerable amount of discussion,7 
are generating increasingly complex profiles of the human mental 
condition. 
                                                            
1. For an overview of current methods, see MATT CARTER & JENNIFER C. SHIEH, GUIDE 
TO RESEARCH TECHNIQUES IN NEUROSCIENCE XIX (2010).  
2. See Will Technology Deliver for “Big Neuroscience”?, 10 NATURE METHODS 271 
(2013); see also Erika Pastrana, Bring on the Neuro Tools, 11 NATURE METHODS 28 (2014).  
3. Reffaella Zanardi et al., New Perspectives on Techniques for the Clinical Psychiatrist: 
Brain Stimulation, Chronobiology and Psychiatric Brain Imaging, 62 PSYCHIATRY & 
CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE 627 (2008); Edward W. Lempinen, Advances in Neuroscience 
Raise Medical Hopes, Social Questions, 333 SCI. 1108 (Aug. 26, 2011). 
4. See, e.g., NEUROSCIENCE (Dale Purves eds., 4th ed. 2008).  
5. For an excellent summary of social cognitive processes, see Ralph Adolphs, The 
Social Brain: Neural Basis for Social Knowledge, 60 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 693 (2009) 
[hereinafter Adolphs 2009]. 
6. Jonathan Smallwood & Jonathan W. Schooler, The Science of Mind Wandering: 
Empirically Navigating the Stream of Consciousness, 66 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 31.1 
(forthcoming 2015); Adrian M. Owen, Detecting Consciousness: A Unique Role for 
Neuroimaging, 64 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 109 (2013). 
7. See, e.g., THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY AND NEUROSCIENCE (John 
Bickle eds., 2013). 
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Perhaps unsurprisingly, these scientific developments have 
caught the attention of legal actors throughout the world. In 2013, US 
President Barack Obama announced a comprehensive federal research 
initiative to fund research of the human brain,8 with similar initiatives 
adopted within the European Union,9 Japan,10 and China.11 US 
Supreme Court decisions on the applicability of severe forms of 
punishment to young offenders explicitly referenced scientific 
findings about the behavioral and biological differences between 
adults and adolescents;12 these decisions have been cited in numerous 
academic writings about the new-found role of scientific evidence 
about the human brain in the court system,13 and scholars now debate 
the potential of science to resolve difficult social and legal questions, 
such as detecting lies14 and improving witness memory.15 Finally, 
high-profile cases in popular recreational sports16 and the military17 
have turned the nation’s attention towards the profound impacts that 
injuries to the human brain can have and have stressed the importance 
of a robust nervous system in healthy, productive lifestyles.18 
                                                            
8. John Markoff & James Gorman, Obama to Unveil Initiative to Map the Human Brain, 
N.Y. TIMES, April 2, 2013, at A12. 
9. James Kanter, 2 Science Projects to Receive Award of 1 Billion Euros, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 28, 2013, at A3. 
10. David Cyranoski, Marmosets are Stars of Japan’s Ambitious Brain Project, 514 
NATURE 151 (2014). 
11. Cai Wenjun, China to Build “Brain Database,” XINHUA NEWS, (June 29, 2012, 
18:45:18), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-06/29/c_133447030.htm. 
12.  Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2464–65 n.5 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 130 
S.Ct. 2011, 2026-27 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005) .  
13. See, e.g., Owen Jones et al., Neuroscientists in Court, 14 NATURE REVS. NEUROSCI. 
730 (2013); Laurence Steinberg, The Influence of Neuroscience on US Supreme Court 
Decisions about Adolescents’ Criminal Culpability, 14 NATURE REVS. NEUROSCIENCE 513 
(2013). 
14. Kamila E. Sip et al., Detecting Deception: the Scope and Limits, 12 TRENDS IN 
COGNITIVE SCI. 48 (2007); Frederick Schauer, Neuroscience, Lie-Detection, and the Law, 14 
TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 101 (2010). 
15. Daniel L. Schacter & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Memory and Law: What Can 
Neuroscience Contribute?, 16 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 119 (2013); Joyce W. Lacy & Craig E. 
L. Stark, The Neuroscience of Memory: Implications for the Courtroom, 14 NATURE REVS. 
NEUROSCIENCE 649 (2013).  
16. Ken Belson, Brain Trauma to Affect One in Three Players, N.F.L. Agrees, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 12, 2014, at A1. 
17. Thom Shanker & Richard A. Oppel Jr., War’s Elite Tough Guys, Hesitant to Seek 
Healing, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2014, at A1.  
18. For a brief glimpse of the profound effects that these disorders can have on both the 
affected individual and society as a whole, see Barabara Bottalico & Tommaso Bruni, Post 
Traumatic Stress Disorder, Neuroscience, and the Law, 35 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 112 
(2012); Thomas J. Farrer & Dawson W. Hedges, Prevalence of Traumatic-Brain Injury in 
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Although our scientific understanding still has far to go,19 our ability 
to define and pinpoint mental and cognitive states has never been 
more refined, and it is fundamentally altering the way we view 
ourselves and our surroundings.       
Long before these scientific advances, however, legal systems 
recognized the need to interpret and describe mental states. From the 
Justinian Codes of Ancient Rome20 to the laws of Imperial China, 21 
legal systems have been using their own language to create and define 
concepts related to mental states for at least two millennia. These 
concepts, such as competency, guilt, intent, and insanity, are critically 
important in basic legal frameworks, and are a provocative example 
of how legal systems employ language to define concepts rooted in 
human cognition. Language relating to “competency,” or “mental 
competency,” is particularly relevant for three reasons: (1) it generally 
applies to both criminal and private law; (2) it generally overlaps with 
concepts of liability and insanity; and (3) it relates directly to our 
fundamental perceptions about human autonomy and basic human 
rights.22 It should be apparent that the use of legal language to define 
mental states can have profound effects on individuals, and now, as 
our scientific understanding continues to improve, it behooves us to 
examine our country’s legal language and consider what, if any, 
improvements could be made. Comparative law presents a unique 
opportunity to aid such an examination, especially given the global 
scale of the scientific and legal inquiries.23 Accordingly, a 
comparative examination of legal language related to mental 
competency is essential for an informed understanding of comparable 
                                                                                                                                     
Incarcerated Groups Compared to the General Population: A Meta-Analysis, 35 PROGRESS IN 
NEURO-PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY & BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 390 (2011); Seena Fazel & 
John Danesh, Serious Mental Disorder in 23,000 Prisoners: A Systematic Review of 62 
Surveys, 350 LANCET 545 (2002).  
19. Though far beyond the scope of this article, the statistics behind these research 
findings are an interesting topic in their own right. See Katherine S. Button et al., Power 
Failure: Why Small Sample Size Undermined the Reliability of Neuroscience, 14 NATURE 
REVS. NEUROSCIENCE 365 (2013).   
20. Dig. 47.10.3.1 (Ulpian, Ad Edictum 56).  
21. Vivien W. Ng, Homicide and Insanity in Qing China, as reprinted in Scraps of 
History: Insane Offenders in Qing, 5 H. K. J. PSYCHIATRY 38, 38 (1995).  
22. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, International Human Rights Law and Comparative 
Mental Health Law: The Universal Factors, 34 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 333, 354-55 
(2006); David Kingdon et al., Protecting the Human Rights of People with Mental Disorder: 
New Recommendations Emerging from the Council of Europe, 185 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 277, 
278 (2005).  
23. See supra notes 8-11, 21. 
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language in the United States, and it can educate any attempts to 
improve these languages in order to better reflect the prevailing 
scientific and medical standards and to promote and maintain 
fundamental human dignity.  
Part I of this Article will examine plain-text selections of legal 
language concerning mental competency from the constitutions, 
codes, or relevant decisions by the highest national courts, of three 
countries: the United States, Germany, and Japan. As three of the 
biggest economic powers on the planet,24 these countries merit 
consideration not just for their contrasting cultural and legal 
frameworks but also for their relative influence within the 
international arena during the latter half of the twentieth century. Part 
I’s examination will focus on constitutional and code language for 
two important reasons: (1) these sources of law form the basis of the 
country’s legal system, and serve as the foundation for other, more 
specific forms of legislation; (2), as the highest form of the country’s 
primary law, they serve as the legal standard against which all the 
other laws are evaluated. Next, Part II will examining the relevant 
language and argue that a certain set of cognitive functions, social-
cognitive functions, most likely underlie these strictly legal 
definitions. Finally, Part III will briefly examine how effectively these 
definitions convey the prevailing scientific standard and consider 
what changes, if any, could be made to the current definitions of 
mental competency in the United States to better reflect both these 
prevailing scientific standards and the foreign definitions. 
I. LEGAL DEFINITIONS OF MENTAL COMPETENCE 
As briefly discussed in the Introduction,25 legal concepts of 
mental competency are generally both an ancient and a fundamental 
component of legal systems.26 Innate notions of fairness and humanity 
may underlie the notion that an individual must be mentally 
competent before he can be subject to the rule of law.27 Despite a 
                                                            
24. WORLD BANK, World Development Indicators Database, Sep. 2014, http://databank.
worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf. 
25. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.  
26. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.  
27. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975) (noting that a requirement of 
competency is “fundamental to the adversarial process”); Youtsey v. United States, 97 F. 937, 
940 (6th Cir. 1899) (“It is fundamental that an insane person can neither plead to an 
arraignment, be subjected to a trial, or, after trial, receive judgment, or, after judgment, 
undergo punishment.”); 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, *24 [hereinafter 
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likely biological basis for these morals-based notions,28 each of the 
three legal systems has developed a seemingly unique set of language 
with which it defines mental competence. That being said, however, 
there is a certain amount of overlap among the linguistic themes 
within the various legal definitions,29 and these similarities and 
differences will be important in the comparative analysis. 
A. The United States 
With its common law tradition and relatively old Constitution, 
the United States offers little in the way of codified or constitutional 
language related to mental competency.30 Beginning in the 1960s, 
however, the US Supreme Court started to incorporate the various 
protections of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment.31 
The US Supreme Court’s review of legal questions salient to due 
process and criminal procedure rights established legal language at 
the level of the US Constitution that defined the standard of 
competency32 and affirmed the notion that common-law notions of 
competency33 fall within the due process protections of the 
Constitution.34 Even though such decisions were (and are) 
                                                                                                                                     
BLACKSTONE] (noting that the “rule of law” for dealing with “idiots and lunatics” is that 
“furiosus furore solum punitur” [A madman is punished only by madness]); Harvard Law 
Review Association, Note, Incompetency to Stand Trial, 81 HARV. L. REV. 454, 454 (1967). 
28. The evidence to support a biological basis in humans for moral and ethical thought 
and action is by now quite compelling. See Debra Lieberman et al., Does Morality Have a 
Biological Basis? An Empirical Test of the Factors Governing Sentiments Relating to Incest, 
270 PROC. FOR ROYAL SOC'Y LONDON 819 (2003); Jorge Moll et al., The Neural Basis of 
Human Moral Cognition, 6 NATURE REV. NEUROSCIENCE 799 (2005); Liane Young et al., 
The Neural Basis of the Interaction Between Theory of Mind and Moral Judgment, 104 PROC. 
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 8235 (2007); see also infra Part II.A.2. 
29. See infra Part I.B, C. 
30. Ostensibly, the founding fathers would have viewed the legal authority to define 
competency as falling within the purview of the various states as an application of the so-
called police power. See U.S. CONST. amend. X; see also Chi., Burlington & Quincy Ry. Co. 
v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 561, 584 (1906). 
31. See generally Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 
101 YALE L.J. 1193 (1992). 
32. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 162 (1975); Dusky v. United States, 364 U.S. 402 
(1960) (per curiam). 
33. See supra note 27. 
34. Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348 (1996) (“The test for incompetence is also well 
settled. A defendant may not be put to trial unless he has sufficient present ability to consult 
with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and a rational as well as 
factual understanding of the proceedings against him.”) (citation omitted); Medina v. 
California, 505 U.S. 437, 439 (1992) (“It is well established that the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the criminal prosecution of a defendant who is not competent 
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infrequent,35 they have established specific legal definitions of mental 
competency for the purposes of the US Constitution’s due process 
protections. 
1. Competency Under Dusky 
The legal language defining mental competency was first 
developed in Dusky v. United States. In determining that the lower 
court had not properly determined that the defendant was competent 
to stand trial, the US Supreme Court held that the appropriate test for 
mental competence was the “sufficient present ability to consult with 
his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding” and “a 
rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against 
him.”36 The per curiam opinion is conspicuously short, and contains 
nothing to hint at the reasoning (scientific or otherwise) that led the 
Court to unanimously adopt this particular language as the controlling 
definition of mental competency.37  
Despite Dusky’s brevity, however, subsequent holdings have 
expounded its definition of mental competency. When the US 
Supreme Court reaffirmed the Dusky language in Godinez v. Moran,38 
it provided some additional clarification of its competency definition. 
Noting that “the crucial component of the [Dusky] inquiry is the 
defendant’s possession of a reasonable degree of rational 
understanding,” the Court explained that this definition of mental 
competency refers to “a particular level of mental functioning, which 
the ability to consult counsel helps identify.”39 The Court also 
suggested that “rational understanding” is synonymous with the 
ability to make “reasoned choices.”40 When the Court again 
reaffirmed the Dusky language in Cooper v. Oklahoma,41 it 
                                                                                                                                     
to stand trial.”); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966) (“The State concedes that the 
conviction of an accused person while he is legally incompetent violates due process.”). 
35. In the latter half of the twentieth century, the Court averaged two decisions on the 
subject of criminal mental health law per decade. Christopher Slobogin, The Supreme Court’s 
Recent Criminal Mental Health Cases: Rulings of Questionable Competence, 22 CRIM. JUST. 
8, 8 (2007). 
36. Dusky v. United States, 364 U.S. 402, 402 (1960).  
37. Legal scholars have noted the opinion’s absence of justification. See Robert F. 
Schopp, Involuntary Treatment and Competence to Proceed in the Criminal Process: Capital 
and Noncapital Cases, 24 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 495, 497 (2006). 
38. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396 (1993). 
39. Id. at 404 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
40. Id. at 397.  
41. Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 354 (1996). 
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emphasized the role that the “ability to consult with his lawyer” plays 
in determining a defendant’s competency. The Court indicated that 
the ability to “communicate effectively with counsel” is necessary to 
exercise rights deemed essential to a fair trial, and, more 
fundamentally, to the basic fairness of the trial itself.42 Though these 
subsequent decisions have created a more complex legal definition of 
mental competency, the Dusky language remains the basic standard 
for mental competency under the due process protections of the US 
Constitution. 
2. Competency Under Clark 
Legal definitions of insanity offer a parallel set of definitions of 
mental competency under the due process rights of the US 
Constitution.43 Unlike the Dusky language, however, the US Supreme 
Court has not created or affirmed a specific legal definition of 
insanity for the purposes of due process. Quite the contrary, in Clark 
v. Arizona, the Court instead held that the Constitution “imposes no 
single canonical formulation of legal insanity.”44 Consequently, each 
of the fifty states imposes its own legal standard, resulting in a 
patchwork distribution of legal language used to define insanity.45  
These standards are not fully disparate, however: four major 
themes underlie the legal definitions of insanity within the United 
States as discussed in Clark. According to the US Supreme Court, 
these themes are “the cognitive incapacity, the moral incapacity, the 
volitional incapacity, and the product-of-mental-illness tests.”46 The 
first two themes are a product of the so-called M’Naghten rule, named 
after the English case in which the rule was first described.47 These 
two standards preclude a defendant from criminal culpability either if 
he suffers from a mental disease or defect as not to know the nature 
and quality of the act (cognitive incapacity) or if he suffers from a 
mental disease or defect as not to know that the act was wrong (moral 
incapacity).48 The third theme, volitional incapacity, precludes a 
defendant from culpability if he was so lacking in volition due to a 
                                                            
42. Id. at 364. 
43. Historically, there might not have been a clear distinction between general mental 
incompetence and insanity. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 27. 
44. Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 753 (2006). 
45. Id. at 750-52. 
46. Id. at 749.   
47. M’Naghten’s Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 10 Cl. & Fin. 200 (1843). 
48. Clark, 548 U.S. at 747-48 (citations omitted). 
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mental defect or illness that he was unable to control his own 
actions.49 The final theme precludes a defendant from criminal 
liability if his action was the product of a mental illness or deficit.50 
Moral incapacity, whether alone or in conjunction with another 
theme, is the most frequent standard in insanity laws.51 These Clark 
tests, then, require a two-pronged analysis. First, there must be a 
“mental disease or defect,” and second, there must be the moral, 
volitional, or cognitive incapacity.52 Even though none of the four 
tests creates a controlling definition of insanity for the purposes of the 
US Constitution’s due process protections, they will serve as a 
suitable proxy for official constitutional definitions. 
It is important to note at this point that these insanity standards 
are a different type of legal definition for mental competency than the 
Dusky standard. Dusky defines mental competency in a positive sense 
(i.e., by the presence of certain abilities or characteristics – namely, 
the ability to consult with counsel and the ability to understand the 
proceedings). The Clark standards, on the other hand, define mental 
competency in a negative sense (i.e., by the absence of certain 
abilities or characteristics – namely, the inability to recognize right 
from wrong).53 While this distinction may appear trivial, it will 
become more important in subsequent analysis. In conclusion, the US 
Supreme Court has affirmed certain definitions of mental competency 
for the purposes of the US Constitution’s due process protections, 
definitions which describe mental competency strictly within a legal 
context. 
B. Germany 
With its civil law tradition54 and extensive codifications,55 
German’s national laws present a somewhat more accessible sample 
                                                            
49. Id. at 749. 
50. Id. at 749-50. 
51. By the Supreme Court’s calculations, forty-four States and the federal government 
use the moral incapacity test in their insanity statutes. Id. at 750-51.  
52. Id. at 749-50. 
53. This distinction should not be confused with the (more common) distinction between 
positive rights and negative rights, which concerns the presence or absence of affirmative legal 
duties. See David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 
864 (1986). 
54. See GERHARD ROBBERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO GERMAN LAW 15-27 (4th ed. 2006); 
see also Reinhard Zimmermann, An Introduction to German Legal Culture, INTRODUCTION 
TO GERMAN LAW 1 (Werner F. Ebke & Matthew W. Finkin, eds., 1996).  
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of legal language with which it defines mental competency in legal 
contexts. To a certain extent, the codified language may permit a less 
ambiguous examination of the legal definitions of mental 
competency, and they are compelling definitions both in their own 
right and as a counterpart to the legal definitions used within the 
United States. 
1. Competency Under German Private Law 
The German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, or “BGB”) 
contains legal definitions of competency that form the basis of mental 
competency descriptions throughout German private substantive law. 
The first such definition is the concept of “Geschäftsunfähigkeit,” or 
incapacity to contract.56 Section 104 of the BGB defines incapacity to 
contract as “a state of pathological mental disturbance which prevents 
the free exercise of will, unless the state is by its nature a temporary 
one.”57 Like the United States’ various definitions of insanity,58 the 
BGB’s definition of mental competency is a negative one, so that 
mental competency is defined not by the presence but by the absence 
of certain abilities (i.e., the ability to freely exercise one’s will).59  
This definition is repeated verbatim in two subsequent sections 
of the BGB. Section 827, which defines loss and reduction of legal 
liability in tort,60 states that a person is not liable for damages if he is 
“in a state of pathological mental disturbance precluding free exercise 
of will.”61 The identical language62 helps effect a more consistent 
                                                                                                                                     
55. See generally TRADITION, CODIFICATION AND UNIFICATION: COMPARATIVE-
HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CIVIL LAW (J.M. Milo et al. eds. 2014). 
56. BÜRGERLICHES GESTZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBl.], 
as amended, § 104, para. 2, translation at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/
index.html (Ger.) [hereinafter BGB]. 
57. Id. para. 2. For the purposes of consistency, all English translations of the codified 
laws are taken from the English versions provided by the German Ministry of Justice, unless 
otherwise noted. 
58. See supra Part I.A.2. 
59. Official commentaries to the BGB define “capacity to contract” (Geschäftsfähigkeit), 
in the positive sense, as “the ability to be able to make generally permissible legal transactions 
independently and fully effectively,” MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR, ZUM BÜRGERLICHEN 
GESETZBUCH, 1222 (Mathias Habersack eds., 6th ed. 2013), or “the ability to independently 
and fully effectively make legal transactions,” PALANDT, BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH, 82 
(C.H. Beck München ed., 72nd ed. 2013). 
60. Commentaries call this legal liability “Deliktsfähigkeit,” “Verschuldnensfähigkeit,” 
or “Zurechnungsfähigkeit.” MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR, supra note 59, at 2370; PALANDT, 
supra note 59, at 1381. 
61. BGB, supra note 56, § 827.  
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legal definition within the German private law context. Finally, 
section 1304 further reinforces this definition of mental competency 
in the context of family law, stating that “a person who is incapable of 
contracting may not enter into a marriage.”63 These three provisions 
of the BGB establish a consistent and specific legal definition of 
mental competency within the sphere of German private substantive 
law. 
In the realm of German private procedural law, the German 
Code of Civil Procedure (“Zivilprozessordnung”, or “ZPO”) ties 
mental competency back to the definition established in the BGB. 
Section 52 of the ZPO defines procedural competency 
(“Prozessfähigkeit”):64 “A person shall have the capacity to sue or be 
sued insofar as he can be obligated by agreements.”65 Although it is 
interesting to note the different phrasing, especially since the related 
provisions of the BGB (§§ 104, 827, 1304) all use language that is 
more or less identical,66 commentaries indicate that mental 
competency in the procedural context overlaps with mental 
competency in the substantive private law context.67 By relying on the 
BGB’s definitions of mental competency, the ZPO reinforces a 
specific legal definition of mental competency within the German 
private law.  
2. Competency Under German Criminal Law 
Unlike US criminal law, German substantive criminal law 
(Strafgeseztbuch, or “StBG”) contains codified language to define 
mental capacity within the criminal law context.68 First, Section 20 of 
the StGB creates an exemption from criminal liability, or 
                                                                                                                                     
62. The subtle difference in the English phrasing is a translation artifact. In the original 
German, both sections use identical language (“einem die freie Willensbestimmung 
ausschließenden Zustand krankhafter Störung der Geistestätigkeit”) to describe the absence of 
legal competency. BGB, supra note 56,  §§ 104, 827. 
63. BGB, supra note 56, § 1304. 
64. ZIVILPROZEßORDUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], as amended, § 52, 
translation at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_zpo/code_of_civil_procedure.pdf 
(Ger.) [hereinafter ZPO]. 
65. Id.  
66. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
67. “Procedural competency is procedural capacity to contract” (“Prozeßfähigkeit ist die 
prozessuale Geschäftsfähigkeit”), BECK’SCHE KURZ KOMMENTARE, 135 (C.H. Beck München 
eds., 50th ed. 1992). 
68. STRAFGESTZBUCH [StGB] [PENAL CODE], as amended, § 20, translation at 
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/ (Ger.) [hereinafter StGB]. 
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“Schuldunfähigkeit.” Section 20 indicates “any person who at the time 
of the commission of the offence is incapable of appreciating the 
unlawfulness of their actions or of acting in accordance with any such 
appreciation due to a pathological mental disorder, a profound 
conscious disorder, debility, or any other serious mental 
abnormality.”69 As was the case for the Clark tests in the United 
States, the language in Section 20 requires a two-pronged analysis in 
order to determine mental competency in the case of insanity.70 First, 
there must be one of the four listed psychopathologies.71 If the first 
prong is met, then there must be a finding that, because of the 
psychopathology, the individual could not appreciate the 
unlawfulness of the act or could not control his own actions.72 Finally, 
note that, like the BGB’s definition of mental competency, the 
definition in Section 20 is a negative definition of mental 
competency, so that competency is described by the absence of the 
various mental capabilities described within the code.73 This 
definition forms the basis not just of complete exculpation but also of 
partial exculpation as well. Section 21 of the StGB notes that a person 
may be eligible for reduced culpability if his capacity to appreciate 
the unlawfulness of his actions or to act in accordance with the 
appreciation is substantially diminished by one of the reasons listed in 
Section 20.74 Because the definition established in Section 20 is 
repeated in Section 21,75 the StGB suggests that the distinction 
between full mental incompetency and partial mental incompetency is 
a quantitative one, not a qualitative one, and that the two are on the 
same spectrum of mental abilities. 
Despite the similarity between the definitions of mental 
competency in German private and criminal law, note that there is one 
                                                            
69. Id. § 20.  
70. “The § 20 determination is built on two parts.” ROXIN, STRAFRECHT, 886(1), (C.H. 
Beck München eds., 4th ed. 2006). 
71. Id. For a more detailed description of the four psychopathologies, see id. at 889(II). 
72. Id. at 886(1); see also Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 749 (2006). These converging 
definitions are not entirely surprising, given that the sort of mental disorders described in both 
are universal human phenomena. However, it is interesting that the German and American 
definitions are so similar even though up until the mid-twentieth century, German criminal law 
had relatively little influence on the development of criminal law in common law countries. 
Markus Dirk Dubber, Theories of Crime and Punishment in German Criminal Law, 53 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 679, 679 (2005). 
73. StGB, supra note 68, § 20. 
74. Id. § 21. 
75. Id. §§ 20-21. The phrase “das Unrecht der Tat einzusehen oder nach dieser Einsicht 
zu handeln” appears in both sections. 
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important difference. In the criminal context, competency can be 
precluded not only by the “pathological mental disorder” but also by 
the other three pathologies,76 whereas in the private law context, 
competency can be precluded only by “a state of pathological mental 
disturbance.”77 Ostensibly, then, mental competency in the criminal 
context is a more difficult standard to meet, as it could be precluded 
not just by a pathological mental disorder but also by mental 
conditions that are technically not pathological, such as a low I.Q.78 In 
summation, German private and criminal codes have specific legal 
definitions for mental competency that both compare and contrast to 
the definitions in the United States. 
C. Japan 
Heavily influenced by both US and German legal philosophies 
and practices, modern Japanese law is something of a hybrid between 
the US common law and German civil law traditions.79 However, the 
Japanese legal system retains a strong commitment to traditional 
cultural notions, creating a unique societal context in which these 
laws are enforced. It is against this backdrop that this Article 
examines Japan’s legal language of mental competency. 
1. Competency Under Japanese Civil Law 
In the civil law context, the Japanese civil code (民法, “Minpō”) 
contains language that creates a specific legal definition of mental 
competency. Article 713 of the Minpō states that a person is not liable 
for civil damages if he causes those damages “while he/she lacks the 
capacity to appreciate his/her liability for his/her own act due to 
mental disability.”80 This language is reminiscent of both the German 
and the American equivalents. First, the wording suggests a two-step 
inquiry as was seen in both the German StGB81 and the US Clark82 
                                                            
76. Id. § 21. 
77. BGB, supra note 56, § 104.  
78. The word translated as “debility” in section 21 of the StGB, “Schwachsinns,” 
literally means “imbecility” or “idiocy.” As used in section 21, the term signifies “an innate 
intellectual deficit without an apparent cause.” ROXHIN, supra note 70, at 896(22). 
79. Elliot J. Hahn, An Overview of the Japanese Legal System, 5 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 
517, 521-22 (1983).  
80. MINPŌ [MINPŌ] [Civ. C.] 1896, art. 713 (Japan), translation at http://www.moj.go.
jp/content/000056024.pdf. All English translations of the Japanese codes are taken from the 
English versions promulgated by the Japanese Ministry of Justice. 
81. StGB, supra note 68, § 20. 
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standards for determining criminal culpability. Second, the phrasing 
of this standard suggests a variant of the “moral incapacity” test,83 a 
condition for mental competency that appears in both the US84 and the 
German85 definitions of mental competency as well. Interestingly, 
however, whereas the United States and Germany use moral 
incapacity to define mental competency in the criminal context, 
Article 713 employs the moral incapacity standard within the civil 
law context.  
2. Competency Under Japanese Criminal Law 
The Japanese criminal codes also contain legal definitions for 
mental competency. Article 39 of the penal code (刑法, “Keihō”) 
defines mental competency for the purposes of exculpation: “An act 
of insanity is not punishable.”86 Similarly, “an act of diminished 
capacity shall lead to the punishment being reduced.”87 This language 
is interesting because, unlike the German and US equivalents, it does 
not specify what sort of behavior or deficits indicate legal insanity or 
inculpability. Whereas both German and US criminal law generally 
define mental incapacity as the inability to control or appreciate one’s 
behavior due to a mental pathology,88 the Keihō simply states that 
mental incapacity is the state of being insane.89 Relatedly, whereas 
German criminal law defines full legal incapacity and diminished 
legal capacity with the same legal language,90 the Keihō creates a 
separate, although related, definition for partial mental incapacity 
altogether.91  
The language put forth in the Keihō is repeated in the Japanese 
code of criminal procedure (刑事訴訟法, “Keisōhō”)92 in three 
separate procedural contexts, and this repetition helps clarify the 
language’s meaning by providing greater context. First, Article 314 of 
                                                                                                                                     
82. Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 747-48 (2006) (citations omitted).  
83. Id. at 747-48; StGB, supra note 68, § 20. 
84. Clark, 548 U.S. at 747-48. 
85. StGB, supra note 68, § 20. 
86. KEIHŌ [KEIHŌ] [Pen. C.] 1907, art. 39, para. 1. 
87. Id. para. 2.  
88. Clark, 548 U.S. at 747-48 (citations omitted); StGB, supra note 68, § 20. 
89. 心神喪失 (shinshinsōshitsu), “unsound mind.”  KEIHŌ, supra note 86, para. 1.  
90. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
91. 心神耗弱 (shinshinmōjaku), “weakened or diminished mind.” KEIHŌ, supra note 86, 
para. 2. 
92. KEIJI SOSHŌHŌ [KEISŌHŌ] [C. Crim. Pro.] 1948. 
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the Keisōhō establishes that insane individuals cannot be prosecuted, 
indicating that “when the accused is in a state of insanity,93 the 
proceedings shall be suspended while the accused is in such a state.”94 
Second, Article 37-4 establishes that insane individuals or individuals 
with diminished mental capacity may have lawyers assigned to 
them.95 Finally, Article 439, which concerns the request of a retrial, 
indicates that a retrial may be requested by “the spouse, lineal 
relative, brother, or sister of the person who has been found guilty, in 
the event that said person is deceased or is in a state of insanity.”96 
The specific repetition of the Keihō’s definition of insanity suggests a 
more unified legal conceptualization of mental competency, and is a 
compelling counterexample to the German and US definitions, in 
which varying language is used for different legal contexts. 
II. UNDERLYING COGNITIVE FUNCTIONS 
While the legal definitions of mental competency examined in 
Part I are purely legal constructs,97 the people who are adjudicated 
(and who adjudicate) under them are not; consequently, the legal 
definitions are fundamentally tied to the cognitive functions with 
which humans act and interact, and to scientific and medical 
information about these functions.98 It should be possible, therefore, 
to define a certain set of scientifically recognized cognitive functions 
                                                            
93. 心神喪失の状態 (shishishōshitsu no jōtai), “a state of insanity.” Id. art. 314, para. 1. 
Note that the word for insanity is identical to that used in the Keihō. See supra note 89. 
94. KEISŌHŌ, supra note 92, art. 314, para. 1. 
95. Id. art. 37-4. 
96. Id. art. 439(1)(iv). 
97. See, e.g., Mae C. Quinn, Reconceptualizing Competence: An Appeal, 66 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 259, 265 (2009) (“Notably, while seemingly straightforward and rooted in 
common sense, neither prong of the [Dusky] test finds its genesis in medical or mental health 
literature.”); Incompetency to Stand Trial, supra note 27, at 470 (“Like criminal responsibility, 
incompetency is a legal question; the ultimate responsibility for its determination must rest in a 
judicial rather than a medical authority.”). 
98. See Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 465 (1992) (“Although competency is a 
legal issue ultimately determined by the courts, recommendations by mental health 
professionals exert tremendous influence on judicial determinations.”) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting); Incompetency to Stand Trial, supra note 27, at 469 (“In most jurisdictions, 
reliance on psychiatric testimony is substantial.”); for a somewhat stronger critique, see Gerald 
T. Bennet & Arthur F. Sullwold, Competence to Proceed: A Functional and Context-
Determinative Decision, 29 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1119, 1120 (1984) (“Uncritical acceptance of the 
undefined role of the expert has led the legal system to abdication of the traditional judicial 
decision-making function, supplanting that task by almost total reliance on and ‘rubber 
stamping’ of those opinions.”). 
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that underlie these legal definitions. Part II will reconsider the legal 
definitions of mental competency in the context of these underlying 
cognitive functions and will suggest a number of social-cognitive 
elements that are consistent throughout the three countries’ various 
legal definitions.  
A. Competency as a Function of Social-Cognitive Processes 
Ultimately, the legal definitions of mental competency require 
the presence of certain mental abilities that allow for functional 
participation within the social context of a legal proceeding.99 The 
scientific community has characterized these mental abilities into a 
suite of cognitive functions known as social cognition.100 Comprising 
the neuropsychological skill set to recognize and manipulate socially 
relevant information,101 social cognition is inherently necessary for 
any meaningful participation in a social context. As the language of 
the various legal definitions of mental competency suggests, social-
cognitive function is key to a finding of mental competency. 
1. Competency as a Function of Context-Driven Cognition    
The first indication that social-cognitive functions underlie legal 
competency is the context-based nature of mental competency. In 
ordinary usage, competence is the state of being functionally adequate 
or of having sufficient skill.102 In broader legal usage, competence is 
the mental ability to understand problems and make decisions or, 
more broadly, a basic or minimal ability to do something.103 
Competency, therefore, varies based on the particular legal purpose 
and depends on contextual factors such as the relative interests at 
                                                            
99. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975) (noting that a person who is not 
mentally competent is someone  “whose mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to 
understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and 
to assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to a trial”); Dusky v. United States, 362 
U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (holding that a person who is mentally competent “has sufficient present 
ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—and 
whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him”); 
Incompetency to Stand Trial, supra note 27, at 457 (noting that the “primary purpose of the 
incompetency rule is to safeguard the accuracy of adjudication”). 
100. See Adolphs 2009, supra note 5. 
101. See Ralph Adolphs, The Neurobiology of Social Cognition, 11 CURRENT OPINION 
IN NEUROBIOLOGY 231, 231 (2001) [hereinafter Adolphs 2001]. 
102. Competence, WEBSTER’S NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 463 (3d ed. 2002). 
103. Competence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2009). 
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stake and the circumstances of the proceedings.104 As suggested by 
the US Supreme Court, “[t]here are, of course, no fixed or immutable 
signs which invariably indicate [competency]: the question is often a 
difficult one in which a wide range of manifestations and subtle 
nuances are implicated.”105 This context-based approach to 
competency implies not only a flexible legal standard but also a focus 
on the pragmatic, outcome-driven nature of a defendant’s 
participation in legal proceedings.106 Social-cognitive functions are 
equally context-specific and recruit both conscious and subconscious 
processes to integrate external stimuli and internal intentions, thereby 
facilitating social behavior: 
Social behavior depends critically on context and intention, a 
sensitivity that arises from the rich interplay between controlled 
and automatic processing of social information, and a modulation 
long emphasized within social psychology. One way of viewing 
such modulations is to think of an initial feed-forward sweep of 
social information processing that is rapid and automatic, 
followed by cycles of additional processing that are biased by the 
first, but modulated by top-down effects that may incorporate 
controlled processing and conscious intent.107 
Social cognition’s ultimate role, then, is to “modulate” socially 
appropriate behavior by integrating socially relevant information with 
the other, domain-general cognitive abilities108 necessary to produce 
                                                            
104. Robert F. Schopp, Wake Up and Die Right: The Rationale, Standard, and 
Jurisprudential Significance of the Competency to Face Execution Requirement, 51 LA. L. 
REV. 95, 1038-39 (1991); Alec Buchanan, Competency to Stand Trial and the Seriousness of 
the Charge, 34 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 458, 459 (2006); Bennet, supra note 98, at 
1121. 
105. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 180 (1975). 
106. “A determination of competence or incompetence is functional in nature, context-
dependent and pragmatic in orientation . . . .” A.B.A., CRIM. JUST. MENTAL HEALTH 
STANDARDS 175 (1989), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminal_
justice_standards/mental_health_complete.authcheckdam.pdf; see also Richard J. Bonnie, The 
Competence of Criminal Defendants with Mental Retardation to Participate in Their Own 
Defense, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 419, 424 (1990). 
107. Adolphs 2009, supra note 5, at 707; see also Jonathan St. B. T. Evans, Dual-
Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cognition, 59 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 
255, 268-70 (2008). Note that, as Evans points out, an increasing number of models have been 
developed to represent the social cognitive processes.  
108. Domain-general cognitive functions are functions that are used for all cognitive 
tasks, regardless of context. Attention and working memory are examples of domain-general 
cognitive functions. See, e.g., Jeremy R. Gray et al., Neural Mechanisms of Fluid Intelligence, 
6 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 316, 316 (2003). 
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intentional, socially relevant action.109 Therefore, social-cognitive 
function is critical to the interaction between socially contextual 
information and intentional actions that underlies mental competency. 
This social-cognitive interaction between context and intention 
is clearly inherent within the various legal definitions of mental 
competency.110 Under the US Dusky standard, a competent individual 
must possess both a rational and a factual understanding of the 
proceedings.111 In order to do so, the individual’s cognitive functions 
must allow him to perceive the necessary contextual information (i.e., 
the factual understanding), and to incorporate his conscious thoughts 
into that information so that he can navigate the proceedings in a 
meaningful way (i.e., the rational understanding).112 This inference 
finds additional support in the US Supreme Court’s characterization 
of Dusky’s “rational understanding” as the ability to make “reasoned 
choices.”113 One of the defining tasks of the social cognition pathway 
                                                            
109. Social cognition provides “input” to these domain-general cognitive processes, and 
social behavior is the “output.” See Adolphs 2001, supra note 101, at 232 (illustrating social 
cognition’s role of processing stimulus input and producing behavior output); for a more 
detailed discussion about the ability to dissociate social cognition from other cognitive 
functions, see infra Part II.A.2. 
110. This interaction between context and intent characterizes the fundamental notions 
of the legal system itself. See Adolphs 2009, supra note 5, at 708 (“The way in which our laws 
assign blame and dole out punishment also captures an important context effect: an interaction 
between the harmful consequences of an action, and the belief and intention of the person 
carrying it out.”).  
111. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960). 
112. “The weighting of personal experience (‘individual information’) against 
information provided from others (‘social information’) is a key determinant of human 
decision making, and numerous factors can determine this weighing, such as the predictability 
of the environment, the relative costs of social and individual information, or the availability of 
suitable models to learn from. Frequently, individual and social information will together 
determine a decision.” Simon M. Reader & Ionnis Leris, What Shapes Social Decision 
Making?, 37 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 63, 96 (2014). 
113. “How this [reasoned choice] standard is different from (much less higher than) the 
Dusky standard – whether the defendant has a ‘rational understanding’ of the proceedings – is 
not readily apparent to us.” Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 397 (1993). The Court when on 
to note that “even assuming that there is some meaningful distinction between the capacity for 
‘reasoned choice’ and a ‘rational understanding’ of the proceedings,” the two standards would 
have the same legal standard of pleading. Id. at 398; see also Schopp, supra note 104, at 1044 
(“While the capacity to reason or to deliberate are not explicitly stated, the rationale implies 
that these are also necessary at least to some minimal degree.”); Bennet and Sullwold, supra 
note 98, at 1121 (explaining that mental competency “encompasses, at least in part, the mental 
ability to make a reasoned choice among alternatives”). 
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is the ability to make reasoned choices,114 to “process multiple 
alternatives and to choose an optimal course of action.”115 In the 
complex social environment of a legal proceeding,116 therefore, it is 
all but certain that the Dusky standard of competency envisions these 
social cognitive abilities within its strictly legal definition.  
Under the definitions in Germany’s BGB, competency, or 
“Geschäftsfähigkeit,” is the ability to exercise free will117 such that an 
individual can be bound by a legal transaction.118 Here, the context-
driven interaction between individual information and social 
information is necessarily applicable,119 because the individual must 
be able to balance various internal and external factors in the process 
of deciding whether to be freely bound by a transaction.120 Therefore, 
the German BGB could imply an additional subset of social-cognitive 
functions specifically necessary to complete social transactions (i.e., a 
contract). Researchers have suggested that these sorts of social 
interactions rely on a unique set of social-cognitive processes, which 
may be tightly coupled with the cognitive processes used in other 
social situations.121 Certainly German private law’s emphasis on the 
                                                            
114. Alan G. Sanfey, Social Decision-Making: Insights from Game Theory and 
Neuroscience, 318 SCI. 598, 598 (2007); Tania Singer, The Past, Present and Future of Social 
Neuroscience: A European Perspective, 61 NEUROIMAGE 437, 442-43 (2012). 
115. James K. Rilling & Alan G. Sanfey, The Neuroscience of Social Decision-Making, 
62 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 23, 24 (2011). 
116. See id. (“[G]iven that we live in highly complex social environments, many of our 
most important decision are made in the context of social interactions.”); see also Reader & 
Leris, supra note 112 (“Important decisions in particular are likely to involve substantial use of 
both individual and social information.”). 
117. BGB, supra note 56, § 104. 
118. MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR, supra note 59;  PALANDT, supra note 59. 
119. Adolphs 2009, supra note 5, at 707; Evans, supra note 107. 
120. Adolphs 2009, supra note 5, at 707; Evans, supra note 107; Reader & Leris, supra 
note 112. 
121. For an experimental consideration of various theories describing the domain-
specific cognitive processes underlying social contracts, see Gerd Gigerenzer & Klaus Hug, 
Domain-Specific Reasoning: Social Contracts, Cheating, and Perspective Change, 43 
COGNITION 127 (1992); see also Leda Cosmides & John Tooby, Social Exchange: The 
Evolutionary Design of a Neurocognitive System, in THE NEW COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE, III 
1295, 1305 (Michael S. Gazzaniga ed., 2005) (suggesting that “[t]he evidence strongly 
supports the claim that reasoning about social exchange is caused by computational machinery 
that is specialized for this function in adults”); Leda Cosmides & John Tooby, Neurocognitive 
Adaptations Designed for Social Exchange, in THE HANDBOOK OF EVOLUTIONARY 
PSYCHOLOGY 584, 587 (D. M. Buss ed., 2005) (arguing that “[t]aken together, the data 
showing design specificity, precocious development, cross-cultural universality, and neural 
dissociability implicate the existence of an evolved, species-typical neurocomputational 
specialization.”). 
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transactional nature of mental competency suggests that the ability to 
conclude legal contracts is uniquely important in that valid 
participation in the private legal system is predicated upon it.122 
Therefore, the definitions of mental competency in German private 
law require not just context-driven social-cognitive functions, but also 
context-driven social-cognitive functions necessary for completing 
social transactions.  
Finally, while nothing in the Japanese definitions of mental 
competency explicitly suggests the dependence of context-driven 
social cognition (at least not to the extent that the German and US 
standards do),123 is seems reasonable to conclude that the Keihō’s 
definition of mental competency requires the same comprehension 
and decision-making skills as Dusky,124 because the Keihō assumes 
that individuals who lack such competency cannot be subject to legal 
proceedings.125 Since these skills require the coordination of social 
and internal information,126 they rely on the social-cognitive functions 
that facilitate them.127 
In conclusion, the legal definitions of mental competency, which 
are grounded in the social context of a legal interaction, suggest that 
the social-cognitive functions that facilitate the interaction between 
social context and individual intentions are a necessary component of 
the legal definition. 
2. Competency as a Function of Social Moral Judgment    
The second indication that social-cognitive functions underlie 
the legal definitions of mental competency is the emphasis on the 
ability to perceive and regulate one’s behavior in the context of social 
norms. The moral incapacity and volitional incapacity tests,128 which 
are a component of the US,129 German,130 and Japanese131 legal 
                                                            
122. BGB, supra note 56, §§ 104, 827, 1304; ZPO, supra note 64; MÜNCHENER 
KOMMENTAR,  supra note 59; PALANDT, supra note 59; BECK’SCHE KURZ KOMMENTARE, 
supra note 67. 
123. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text. 
124. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960); supra note 116 and 
accompanying text. 
125. KEIHŌ, supra note 86, art. 1. 
126. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
127. See Adolphs 2001, supra note 101. 
128. See Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 749-50 (2006). 
129. Id. 
130. StGB, supra note 68, § 20. 
131. Minpō, supra note 80, art. 713.  
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definitions of mental competency, generally require an individual to 
appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions. Ostensibly, this 
requirement is predicated on an individual’s ability to recognize 
societal standards of right and wrong, to appreciate how his actions 
will impact himself and others, and to appropriately regulate his 
behavior in conformance with the societal standards. These abilities 
all depend on social-cognitive functions, and this dependency further 
supports the assertion that social cognition underlies mental 
competency. 
Social cognition research has well classified the 
neuropsychological basis for moral and ethical judgments.132 In fact, 
regulating behavior based on moral and societal norms is perhaps one 
of the most important aspects of social-cognitive functions:133 social 
cognition provides the appropriate social input, which is necessary to 
produce the appropriate social behavior.134 Moral judgment requires 
the cognitive function to recognize both one’s own inner sense of 
morality and the sense of morality of others,135 so it is natural that 
these cognitive functions are expressly indicated by the various legal 
definitions of mental competency.136  
It is also known, however, that the moral judgment–related 
cognitive functions are dissociable from other domain-general 
                                                            
132. See Adolphs 2009, supra note 5, at 697. Note that moral judgment is also heavily 
dependent on context and the interaction between internal and external factors. Adolphs 2001, 
supra note 101, at  698 (“We judge actions to be right or wrong, and the people who carry 
them out to be good or bad, based on emotion, inference, automatic and reflective processing, 
and a host of processes that have evolved to subserve reciprocity, fairness, loyalty, respect, and 
other behavioral disposition.”); Young et al., supra note 28, at 8235 (“Developmental evidence 
thus suggests that mature moral judgments depend crucially on the cognitive processes 
responsible for representing and integrating information about beliefs and outcomes.”); Moll et 
al., supra note 28, at 804 (“Humans integrate extensive contextual elements when assessing 
the behavior of others and when appreciating their own actions in a given situation.”). 
133. Moll et al., supra note 28, at 799 (“Morality is a product of evolutionary pressures 
that have shaped social cognitive and motivational mechanisms, which had already developed 
in human ancestors, into uniquely human forms of experience and behavior.”); id., at 804 
(“Morality is a real-world business. It is about people navigating, interacting and making 
choices in an ever-changing world.”).  
134. Adolphs 2001, supra note 101. 
135. Young et al., supra note 28, at 8235 (Successful moral judgment requires “not just 
‘theory of mind,’ or the ability to represent the mental states of others, but the ability to 
integrate this information with information about consequences in the context of moral 
judgment.”); Turkstra et al., supra note 109, at 5 (suggesting that impairments in this so-called 
perspective taking ability may be “one of the most socially handicapping sequelae” of 
impaired cognitive function). 
136. Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 749-50 (2006); StGB, supra note 68, § 20; Minpō, 
supra note 80, art. 713. 
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cognitive functions, such as memory or attentional control.137 It is 
possible, therefore, to retain the cognitive functions necessary to 
general functioning while losing the cognitive functions necessary to 
undertake appropriate social judgment. This dissociation is often seen 
in individuals who display extremely antisocial behavior, such as 
psychopaths.138 Even though these individuals are often severely 
impaired in their abilities to regulate behavior based on appropriate 
societal norms, they can nevertheless be successful in their careers or 
their goals.139 Cases such as these emphasize the importance not only 
of general cognitive abilities, such as intelligence or rational thinking, 
but also of the social-cognitive functions that allow individuals to 
modify their behaviors based on appropriate social norms.140  
This dissociation creates difficultly for the various legal 
definitions of mental competency. For example, it is possible to 
imagine a scenario in which, under the various German definitions of 
competency, an individual with these types of deficits is cognitively 
capable of performing a legal transaction,141 thereby meeting the legal 
definition of mental competency under the BGB.142 Simultaneously, 
however, the individual’s deficits, which are presumably “serious 
mental abnormalities,”143 might prevent him from appreciating the 
illegality or wrongfulness of his actions, thereby precluding mental 
competency under the StGB.144 A similar scenario could be imagined 
for the mental competency definitions under US law: an individual 
may have the comprehension and decision-making abilities to be able 
                                                            
137. See, e.g., Adolphs 2009, supra note 5, at 704; Steven W. Anderson et al., 
Impairment of Social and Moral Behavior Related to Early Damage in Human Prefrontal 
Cortex, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 1032, 1032 (1995); Takahiro Osumi & Hideki Ohira, The 
Positive Side of Psychopathy: Emotional Detachment in Psychopathy and Rational Decision-
Making in the Ultimatum Game, 49 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 451, 451 
(2010); Mike Koenigs et al., Damage to Prefrontal Cortex Increases Utilitarian Moral 
Judgments, 446 NATURE  908, 908 (2007); see also supra note 108. 
138. Anderson et al., supra note 137; Osumi, supra note 137; Koenigs et al., supra note 
137. 
139. Osumi, supra note 137 (“[P]sychopathy itself may not be decisive in one’s social 
maladaptation; rather, it may enhance some types of social success. It has been a mystery why 
psychopathy includes such contradictory aspects as antisocial and successful achievements.”). 
140. Riling, supra note 115, at 36-37. 
141. See MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR, supra note 59; see also PALANDT, supra note 59. 
142. BGB, supra note 56, § 104; MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR, supra note 59; PALANDT, 
supra note 59. 
143. STGB, supra note 68, § 20. 
144. Id. 
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to meet the Dusky standard for mental competency,145 but may be 
precluded from competency under Clark because his cognitive 
deficits impaired his social cognition and prevented him from 
appreciating that the act was wrong.146 Finally, this same individual 
may be precluded from mental competency under both the civil147 and 
criminal148 legal definitions of Japan. These hypothetical examples149 
underscore social cognition’s role within a determination of mental 
competency. If these legal determinations of mental competency did 
not contain a consideration of social cognition, they would be unable 
to distinguish between an individual who is cognitively capable of 
performing an action while conforming to social value norms and an 
individual who is cognitively capable of performing that action while 
not conforming to social value norms. Since this distinction is 
critically important for the purposes of determining competency under 
the definitions of all three counties,150 a consideration of social 
cognition must underlie the legal definitions of competency. 
In summation, the identifiable cognitive basis for moral 
judgment and the reliance on this aspect of human behavior within the 
various legal definitions of mental competency strongly suggest that 
the former underlies the latter, and further suggests that social-
cognitive functions are a necessary component of the various legal 
definitions. 
3. Competency as a Function of Normal Adult Cognition 
The third and final indication that social-cognitive functions 
underlie the legal definitions of mental competency is the general 
presumption of competency within normal adults. Since social-
cognitive functions are a natural component of normal human 
development,151 any presumption of competency in normal adults 
must necessarily refer to social-cognitive functions. 
                                                            
145. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960); see also supra Part II.A.1. 
146. Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 749-50 (2006). 
147. MINPŌ, supra note 80.  
148. KEIHŌ, supra note 86. 
149. Note that, because mental competency is a legal determination, the courts would 
ultimately determine the fate of these hypothetical individuals. See supra note 97. 
150. Clark, 548 U.S. at 749-50 (2006); StGB, supra note 68, § 20; Minpō, supra note 80, 
art. 713; see also supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
151. See Stephanie Burnett & Sarah-Jane Blakemore, The Development of Adolescent 
Social Cognition, 1167 ANN. N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 51 (2009). 
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 The legal definitions of mental competency presume 
competency both explicitly and implicitly. In the United States, the 
Supreme Court has held that the US Constitution permits an explicit 
presumption of competence under Dusky. In Medina v. California, the 
US Supreme Court held that a state law that imposed a presumption 
of competence on the defendant did not violate the Constitution’s due 
process protections.152 Therefore, mental competency assumes that 
individuals are competent until proven otherwise, suggesting that 
mental competency refers to cognitive functions that are the norm, not 
the exception. Conversely, the legal definitions under Clark make an 
implicit presumption of mental competence. Clark creates a negative 
definition of mental competency, so that mental competency is 
described not by the presence of certain abilities (as is the case in 
Dusky),153 but rather by the absence of certain abilities; that is, 
individuals are presumed competent unless they have a mental disease 
or defect and one of the corresponding incapacities.154 Under German 
law, the presumption of competency is understood to be the general 
rule for both private law155 and for criminal law.156 Additionally, as 
was true for the United States’ Clark definitions, both the BGB and 
the StGB define competency in negative terms,157 further suggesting 
that normal cognitive functions are the legal standard. Finally, the 
Japanese laws imply a presumption of mental competency by creating 
a dichotomy between “insane” or “diminished” mental states, which 
are precluded from legal adjudication,158 and all other mental states, 
which are not. In all three legal systems, then, mental competency is 
assumed to encompass normal adult functioning, including social 
cognition. 
                                                            
152. Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 452-53 (1992). See generally Bruce J. Winick, 
Presumptions and Burdens of Proof in Determining Competency to Stand Trial: An Analysis of 
Medina v. California and the Supreme Court’s New Due Process Methodology in Criminal 
Cases, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 817 (1993) (analyzing the merits of the US Supreme Court’s due 
process–oriented approach to resolving the competency issue underlying Medina). 
153. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960). 
154. Clark, 548 U.S. at 749-50; see also supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
155. MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR, supra note 59 (“The BGB is based on the rule that 
every person is competent to contract. It is standard only as an exception, then, that someone 
be viewed as incompetent or as having limited competence.”); PALANDT, supra note 59 (“The 
law fundamentally views every person as being competent to contract.”).  
156. ROXIN, supra note 70 (“The legislature assumes that an adult who puts criminal 
injustice into effect is normally culpable”). 
157. BGB, supra note 56; STGB, supra note 68. 
158. MINPŌ, supra note 80; KEIHŌ, supra note 86. 
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Social-cognitive functions are a critically important component 
of normal human existence,159 and this importance further suggests 
that social cognition is inherently included in any consideration of 
normal cognition. These functions develop very early in life,160 and 
by approximately two years of age, children can manipulate and 
produce complex social behaviors.161 Injury during this time period 
can produce lasting negative outcomes and impair the development of 
social-cognitive functions.162 There is no doubt, though, that typical 
adults have the ability to recognize both their own cognitive processes 
and those of the people around them.163 Because social-cognitive 
functions are a necessary part of typical adult behavior, and because 
all three legal systems presume mental competence in typical adults, 
social-cognitive functions must be envisioned by the legal definitions 
of mental competency. 
In summation, three key aspects of the various legal definitions 
of mental competency suggest that social-cognitive functions underlie 
mental competency’s legal conceptualization. First, mental 
competency is a function of the law’s social context and the 
interaction between an individual’s internal and external social 
perceptions. Second, mental competency necessarily requires the 
ability to judge and regulate one’s behavior against the backdrop of 
social moral norms. Third, the law generally presumes that 
individuals with typical cognitive abilities are mentally competent. 
Because social-cognitive functions underlie all three aspects, the legal 
                                                            
159. Adolphs 2001, supra note 101 (“Many species live in societies of multiple 
individuals, giving rise to opposing factors that shape the evolution of their social behavior: on 
one hand, groups can offer better prospects for survival; on the other hand, groups can 
generate within-group competition between individuals. A reconciliation of these factors is 
found in two distinct evolutionary solutions: rigid, eusocial behavior . . . or the highly 
complex, flexible social behavior exemplified by primates. The latter solution requires social 
cognition.”). 
160. Id. (“The development of social cognitive abilities is tied closely to the 
development of emotion and of its communication between infant and mother, a topic that has 
seen enormous research from developmental social psychology.”); Burnett, supra note 151, at 
51; Anderson et al., supra note  137. 
161. Burnett, supra note 151, at 51. 
162. Anderson et al., supra note 137. 
163. Adolphs 2009, supra note 5, at 696 (“Yet in typical adults there is no doubt 
whatsoever that we have knowledge of other minds and our own.”); R. Raxe, S. Carey, & N. 
Kanwisher, Understanding Other Minds: Linking Developmental Psychology and Functional 
Neuroimaging, 55 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 87 (2004) (“Normal adults attribute to one another 
(and to themselves) unobservable internal mental states, such as goals, thoughts, and feelings, 
and use these to explain and predict behavior.”).  
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definitions of mental competency suggest a meaning that necessarily 
includes social cognition. 
III. POTENTIAL IMPROVEMENTS TO THE US DEFINITIONS OF 
COMPETENCY 
To conclude the analysis, Part III will briefly consider how and 
to what extent real-world legal trends within the United States follow 
the analysis as described in Part II. Part III will briefly critique certain 
practices related to competency and criminal justice in the United 
States, and will suggest a number of improvements that would allow 
for greater accommodation and recognition of the social-cognitive 
functions that underlie mental competency.    
Despite the (relatively) unambiguous requirements for mental 
competency under the Dusky and Clark definitions, the results of 
competency determinations in practice do not always reflect the legal 
definition’s underlying requirements or underlying concepts of 
fairness and justice. In the United States, competency hearings are a 
common occurrence, estimated at some 60,000 a year.164 Of these, 
about eighty percent reach a finding of competency, with mental 
retardation and psychosis being the two most common exclusion 
factors.165 Perhaps unsurprisingly, a myriad of anecdotes exist to 
demonstrate how individuals who have obvious cognitive 
impairments nevertheless face trial and punishment.166 While these 
grim examples also illustrate the fact that mental competency is 
ultimately a legal question,167 they nevertheless suggest possible 
improvements to the legal definitions of competency within the 
United States. 
                                                            
164. Mossman et al., AAPL Practice Guideline for the Forensic Psychiatric Evaluation 
of Competence to Stand Trial, 35 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. S3, S3 (2007); Liselotte van 
den Anker, Fitness to Stand Trial: A General Principle of European Criminal Law?, 7 
UTRECHT L. REV. 120, 123 (2011). 
165. Mossman et al., supra note 164, at S55. 
166. See, e.g., Ed Pilkington, Texas Poised to Execute Intellectually Disabled Prisoner 
Within Hours, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/
29/texas-execute-intellectually-disabled-prisoner-robert-ladd; see also Erik Eckholm, After 
Delay, Inmate is Executed in Georgia, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/
2014/12/10/us/georgia-supreme-court-refuses-to-delay-execution.html?_r=0. While this article 
recognizes that there are considerably more legal issues at play in these cases than merely the 
U.S. Constitution’s standards for mental competency, these anecdotes are prime examples of 
individuals with obvious social-cognitive impairments.  
167. See supra note 97. 
2015] SOZIALE KOMPETENZ 127 
First, the United States should consider a conceptualization of 
mental competency that emphasizes the interpersonal nature of 
cognition functioning. The language in the BGB is a good model to 
demonstrate the significance of this transactional nature of social 
cognition. Because the BGB’s definition of mental competency 
focuses on the dyadic nature of legal exchanges,168 it better represents 
the underlying nature of human social interactions. As described 
above, the social context of an individual’s actions (legal or 
otherwise) is an important factor in competency.169 The BGB’s 
portrayal of competency captures the importance of accurately 
representing mental competency within the proper relational 
context.170 Indeed, research on interpersonal interactions has 
recognized the importance of studying human cognition not in 
isolation but as part of a social system,171 so that the proper unit of 
measurement is not the cognitive abilities of the individual in a 
vacuum but the cognitive abilities of the individual as he interacts 
with those around him.172  
If the United States could incorporate explicit reference to the 
interpersonal, transactional nature of human cognition into the legal 
standards for mental competency, then it would better represent the 
underlying social-cognitive context. It should be noted that this theme 
is not entirely absent from the US legal system. Under Dusky, a 
competent defendant will be able to understand the criminal 
proceedings and consult with his lawyer, both of which are 
interpersonal,173 and under Clark, an individual must appreciate the 
                                                            
168. MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR, supra note 59; PALANDT, supra note 59. 
169. Supra Part 2.A.1. 
170. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
171. See, e.g., Riitta Hari et al., Synchrony of Brains and Bodies During Implicit 
Interpersonal Interaction, 17 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 105, 105 (2013) (“Mutual 
understanding requires a certain level of between-participant similarity in perception and 
action . . . . Altogether, human brains and minds are not as private as traditionally thought.”); 
Uri Hasson et al., Brain-to-Brain Coupling: A Mechanism for Creating and Sharing a Social 
World, 16 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 114, 114 (2012) (“With so many cognitive faculties 
emerging from interpersonal space, a complete understanding of the cognitive processes within 
a single individual’s brain cannot be achieved without examining and understanding the 
interactions among individuals.”). 
172. Hari et al., supra note 171 (suggesting that this research might “provide the 
necessary methodological and conceptual leaps from the level of individuals to dyads”); 
Hasson et al., supra note 171 (calling for a “shift from single-brain to multi-brain frame of 
reference”). 
173. Dusky v. United States, 364 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam). 
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wrongfulness of his actions,174 which is also arguably interpersonal. 
Nevertheless, the US definitions lack a clear conceptualization of 
mental competency within a social frame of reference. Interestingly, 
lower courts in the United States have employed standards for mental 
competency law that approached the BGB’s codified definition.175 
While these legal issues may be beyond the jurisdiction of the US 
Constitution and Supreme Court, they nevertheless make clear the 
inherently social nature of legal transactions.176 Additionally, the 
American Academy of Psychiatry and Law’s practice guidelines for 
forensic psychologists and psychiatrists suggests that a consideration 
of social cognitive factors is important in competency 
determinations.177 While not explicitly advocating for an assessment 
of social-cognitive function, the guidelines urge examiners to obtain 
information to “establish rapport while simultaneously providing a 
helpful perspective on the defendant’s intelligence and social 
functioning” and to “provide insight into how the defendant 
establishes or sustains relationships, which may help the psychiatrist 
gauge the defendant’s capacity to relate to the defense attorney.”178 
These examples all suggest that recognition of social transaction is an 
informal part of competency within the US legal system, but a more 
explicit reference within the US Constitution’s legal definition would 
ensure that competency determinations are made with an account of 
social-cognitive functions. 
 Second, the United States should consider adopting a 
conceptualization of mental competency that accounts for diminished 
capacity. Both German and Japanese criminal law explicitly 
incorporate diminished mental capacity into the legal definition of 
mental competency.179 In the United States, however, there is no clear 
                                                            
174. Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 749-50 (2006); see supra Part 2.A.2. 
175. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of O’Brien, 847 N.W.2d 710 (Minn. 2014);  Davis v. 
Marshall, No. 94APE02-158, 1994 WL 425169, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 9, 1994). 
176. In re Guardianship of O’Brien, 847 N.W.2d at 715 (describing that competency 
exists if a person “has enough mental capacity to understand, to a reasonable extent, the nature 
and effect of what he is doing” or “can fairly understand the matter he is considering”); Davis, 
1994 WL 425169, at *3 (“The test of competency to contract is whether the powers of a 
person’s mind have been so affected as to destroy the ability to understand the nature of the act 
in which he is engaged, its scope and effect or its nature and consequences. If a person, at the 
time of entering into a contract, understands the nature, extent and scope of the business he is 
about to transact, and possesses that degree of mental strength which would enable him to 
transact ordinary business, he is in law considered a person of sound mind and memory.”). 
177. Mossman et al., supra note 164, at S33.  
178. Id. 
179. StGB, supra note 68, § 21; KEIHŌ, supra note 86. 
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standard: although the Model Penal Code adopted a provision for 
diminished capacity,180 there is considerable debate over how 
diminished capacity should be implemented.181 The German and the 
Japanese models, however, are perhaps more accurate with regard to 
the variable nature of human cognition. As indicated in Part I, the 
definitions used by the German and Japanese codes suggest that 
mental competency and partial competency exist on a spectrum of 
mental cognitive function.182 This portrayal of human cognition on a 
spectrum, such that certain cognitive functions can exist at relative 
levels, is how scientific and medical research now characterizes 
certain human disorders, including those that can impair social-
cognitive function.183 The German and Japanese definitions, 
therefore, are perhaps better able to accommodate the broad range of 
cognitive functions that exist both in normal humans and in 
individuals with mental disorders.  
Finally, the United States should consider adopting a 
conceptualization of mental competency that captures a wider range 
of conditions that might preclude competency. The German and 
Japanese definitions of mental competency better allow the inclusion 
of a broader range of social-cognitive impairments that could 
potentially affect competency. Recall that, while the United States 
defines incapacity as the product of a “mental disease or defect,”184 
German law defines incapacity as the product of a “pathological 
mental disorder, a profound conscious disorder, debility, or any other 
serious mental abnormality.”185 It is possible, therefore, that certain 
social-cognitive deficits which meet the German standard might not 
meet the US standard. One highly relevant example is language 
disorders. Language is a key component of social-cognitive 
                                                            
180. Model Penal Code § 4.02(1) (Am. Law Inst., Proposed Official Draft, 1962). 
181. See Stephen J. Morse, Undiminished Confusion in Diminished Capacity, 75 J. CRIM 
L. & CRIMINIOLOGY 1, 28 (1984); Peter Arenella, The Diminished Capacity and Diminished 
Responsibility Defenses: Two Children of a Doomed Marriage, 77 COL. L. REV. 827, 863 
(1977) (both arguing that the proper conceptualization of diminished capacity is the “mens 
rea” variant as opposed to the “diminished responsibility” variant). 
182. See supra note 74 and accompanying text; see supra note 91 and accompanying 
text. 
183. See Selwyn B. Renard et al., Dissociation and Social Cognition in Schizophrenia 
Spectrum Disorder, 137 SCHIZOPHRENIA RESEARCH 219, 219-20 (2012); Tiziana Zalla, 
Amygdala, Oxytocin, and Social Cognition in Autism Spectrum Disorder, 76 BIOLOGICAL 
PSYCHIATRY 356, 357 (2014). 
184. Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 749-50 (2006). 
185. StGB, supra note 68, § 20.  
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function,186 and language disorders are generally over-represented in 
individuals within the criminal justice system.187 While language 
disorders most likely contribute to negative outcomes in a legal 
context,188 a language impairment might not necessary qualify as a 
“mental disease or defect” under the US definition. It could, however, 
qualify as a “serious mental abnormality”189 under the German 
standard or a “weakened mind”190 under the Japanese standard. 
Language and communication skills are especially important given 
the decision in Cooper, in which the US Supreme Court explicitly 
included the ability to effectively communicate with counsel within 
the Dusky standard.191 Because cognitive deficits such as language 
impairments192 appear to fall through the cracks under the current US 
                                                            
186. See Lyn Turkstra, Should My Shirt Be Tucked In Or Left Out? The Communication 
Context of Adolescence, 14 APHASIOLOGY 349, 349 (2000); Nancie Im-Bolter et al., I Thought 
We Were Good: Social Cognition, Figurative Language, and Adolescent Psychopathology, 54 
J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 724, 724 (2013); Cynthia Dahlberg et al., Social 
Communication Skills in Persons With Post-Acute Traumatic Brain Injury: Three 
Perspectives, 20 BRAIN INJURY 425, 425 (2006). 
187. See Juliette Gregory & Karen Bryan, Speech and Language Therapy Intervention 
With a Group of Persistent and Prolific Young Offenders in a Non-Custodial Setting With 
Previously Undiagnosed Speech, Language and Communication Difficulties, 46 INT’L J. 
LANGUAGE & COMM. DISORDERS 202, 203 (2011); Pamela C. Snow et al., Oral Language 
Competence, Young Speakers, and the Law, 43 LANGUAGE, SPEECH, & HEARING SERVICES IN 
SCHOOLS 496, 502-03 (2012). 
188. Indeed, there is research to suggest that legal language is particularly difficult to 
cognitively comprehend and manipulate. See, e.g., Michele Lavigne & Gregory Van Rybroek, 
“He Got in My Face so I Shot Him”: How Defendants’ Language Impairments Impair 
Attorney-Client Relationships, 17 CUNY L. REV. 69 (2014); Pamela Snow & Martine Powell, 
Youth (In)justice: Oral Language Competence in Early Life and Risk for Engagement in 
Antisocial Behavior in Adolescence, 435 TREND & ISSUES IN CRIME & CRIM. JUST. 1 (2012); 
Joseph Wszalek & Lyn Turkstra, Language Impairments in Youths with Traumatic Brain 
Injury: Implications for Participation in Criminal Proceedings, 30 J. HEAD TRAUMA & 
REHABILITATION 86 (2015). 
189. StGB, supra note 68, § 20. 
190. KEIHŌ, supra note 86, art. 39, para. 2. 
191. Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 354 (1996).  
192. Although the topic is beyond the limits of this article, it is unquestionable that 
functional language usage is also suggested within the various legal definitions of mental 
competency, as an individual’s ability to use language will profoundly affect his ability to act 
within the legal system. See Michele Lavigne & Greg J. Rybroek, Breakdown in the Language 
Zone: The Prevalence of Language Impairments among Juvenile and Adult Offenders and Why 
It Matters, 15:1 U.C. DAVIS JUV. L. & POL’Y  37, 69; see also Wszalek, supra note 188, at 88-
90. The cognitive and neurobiological bases for language and communication in humans have 
been extensively studied. See, e.g., Uri Hasson & Steven L. Small, Functional Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging (fMRI) Research of Language, in  HANDBOOK OF THE NEUROSCIENCE OF 
LANGUAGE 81 (Brigitte Stemmer & Harry A. Whitaker, eds., 2008); see also Charles A. 
Perfetti & Gwen A. Frishkoff, The Neural Bases of Text and Discourse Processing, in 
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definition of mental competency, the adoption of a definition closer to 
that of Germany or Japan may allow US courts to better observe the 
fundamental concepts of fairness and due process that underlie 
competency requirements and to better reflect the prevailing scientific 
and medical norms.193 
 CONCLUSION  
The scientific progress of the twenty-first century has discovered 
a multitude of information about the nature and function of the human 
brain and human mental conditions.194 National and international 
actors195 increasingly recognize the social aspect of human cognition, 
social cognition, as a fundamental and necessary component of 
healthy human life.196 As this information draws greater and greater 
traction within global society, however, it is unclear how the scientific 
understanding of human cognition relates to legal definitions of 
mental capacity and mental competence. As this Article concluded, it 
appears that the plain-text legal definitions of three important legal 
systems (those of the United States, Germany, and Japan) all envision 
social cognition as a component of the legal consideration of mental 
competency.197 However, the current US legal standards for mental 
competency would be better able to reflect the underlying scientific 
and biological realities if the United States were to incorporate 
features of the German and the Japanese definitions.198 Even though 
no one legal definition will (or perhaps even should)199 fully 
                                                                                                                                     
HANDBOOK OF THE NEUROSCIENCE OF LANGUAGE 165 (Brigitte Stemmer & Harry A. 
Whitaker, eds., 2008). 
193. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
194. See supra note 4. 
195. See supra notes 8-11. 
196. See, e.g., Social  Participation, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, http://www.who.
int/social_determinants/thecommission/countrywork/within/socialparticipation/en/ (defining 
social participation as “one of the main axes for the development of the Primary Health Care 
Strategy and in reaching health system goals” in the 2008 World Health Report); see also 
Social (Pragmatic) Communication Disorder, AMER. PSYCHIATRIC ASSOC., http://www.dsm5.
org/Documents/Social%20Communication%20Disorder%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf (indicating 
that, under the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
released in 2013, impairments to social communication and social participation are a 
recognized and medically-classified disorder). 
197. See supra Part II. 
198. See supra Part III. 
199. It is important to remember that, as has been indicated several times, the question of 
mental competency is ultimately a legal question that must be answered by the law. See supra 
note 97.  
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incorporate the underlying scientific bases of human mental 
functions, the German definitions of mental competency reflect 
certain important aspects of the transactional, context-driven nature of 
human cognition and explicitly define competency within a social 
context.200 Additionally, both the German and the Japanese 
definitions accommodate diminished mental capacity, which more 
accurately represents the spectrum of cognitive functioning (social or 
otherwise) that individuals can posses.201  
As society and scientific understanding become more and more 
global, comparative legal analyses play an important role in analyzing 
US laws, and the legal language related to mental competency is no 
exception. Although the United States, Germany, and Japan all rely 
on legal definitions of mental competency that suggest a certain set of 
essential cognitive functions, the United States would do well to 
consider the German and Japanese definitions so that its legal 
standards can better reflect both the underlying biological processes 
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